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THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS:
IS THE MEDICAL REVIEW COMMITTEE
A VIABLE AND LEGAL ALTERNATIVE?
INTRODUCTION
The concept of medical malpractice recently has been the
subject of intense discussion in the nation's newspapers, maga-
zines and legal periodicals.' Perhaps the principal reason for the
increased interest in this subject is the tremendous rise in the
number of medical malpractice lawsuits during recent years. It
has been estimated that the number of malpractice claims in-
creased ten-fold between 1930 and 1940 and another ten-fold be-
tween 1940 and 1950.2 In addition, there has been a significant
increase in claims from 1950 to 1970.' And, in the last five
years, it is estimated that nationwide the number of malpractice
suits has doubled to 20,000 per year. 4
The increase in the number of malpractice suits filed in
Northern California has been especially pronounced. Insurance
experts state that 267 malpractice suits were filed against physi-
cians in Northern California in 1967, and the number had risen
to 477 by 1972. 5
Not only has the number of malpractice suits increased, but
the damages awarded in such suits have also risen substantially.6
In 1973, for example, a San Francisco jury awarded $4,025,000
1. See e.g., Annas, Medical Malpractice: Are the Doctors Right? 10 TRIAL
59 (July-Aug. 1974); Symposium: Medical Malpractice in California, 8 U.S.F.L.
REv. 227 (1973); Malpractice: The High Cost, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1974, at 50;
The malpractice ciunch: Impact on U.S. medicine, SCIENCE NEWS, May 26, 1973,
at 338; San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 31, 1975, at 1, col. 8; San Francisco
Chronicle, July 3, 1974, at 7, col. 2.
2. AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-THE
ATL SEMINAR 31 (1966).
3. See SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION, 91st CONG.,
1ST SESs., A STUDY ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS THE PHYSI-
CIAN (Comm. Print 1969). For example, a Cleveland defense attorney, in testify-
ing before the Senate subcommittee investigating medical malpractice, estimated
that the number of malpractice suits he has defended increased 400 percent be-
tween 1955 and 1966. In addition, a representative of the Aetna Life and Cas-
ualty Company, in testifying before the same committee, stated that the number
of malpractice claims increased 43 per cent between 1965 and 1969. Id. at 8.
4. Report on Medical Malpractice, CBS Evening News, Jan. 23, 1975. See
also NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1974, at 50.
5. San Francisco Chronicle, July 3, 1974, at 7, col. 2.
6. Id.
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to a paralyzed boy in a suit against a physician and a hospital.7
In addition, two other malpractice suits brought in Northern Cali-
fornia were recently settled out of court-one for $2 million and
the other for $1.3 million.8
This comment will survey the responses of the malpractice
insurers to this medical malpractice crisis. It focuses on the
operation and effectiveness of one of those responses-the mal-
practice screening committee. The validity of the malpractice
screening committee was recently scrutinized by the California
Court of Appeal in the case of Garner v. American Mutual Lia-
bility Insurance Co.9 In that case the court held that the malprac-
tice insurer must itself consider and determine whether or not to
accept a settlement offer and cannot delegate such a decision to
a medical screening committee. This comment examines the
Garner decision in light of current California law, and discusses
the effects of that decision on California physicians and their in-
surers.
RESPONSES TO THE MALPRACTICE CRISIS
In response to the rise in the number of malpractice cases
and the significant increase in the damages awarded in such suits,
many companies have discontinued underwriting medical mal-
practice insurance. 10 At present, only five companies still provide
this type of protection for doctors, and most of these companies
have found the decision to remain in the malpractice business a
difficult one."
The companies which have continued to provide professional
liability insurance to physicians have instituted a number of mea-
sures to deter the filing of baseless malpractice suits and to assure
the continued availability of malpractice insurance. The most im-
portant measures implemented by these malpractice insurers have
been (1) an increase in the premiums for malpractice coverage,
(2) the establishment of peer review committees to determine
which physicians are good insurance risks, and (3) the creation
of panels to review malpractice claims.
Increased Malpractice Insurance Premium
In an attempt to meet the rising cost of malpractice litigation,
insurance carriers have increased dramatically their insurance
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
10. Linster, Insurance View of Malpractice, 38 INs. COUNSEL J. 528 (1971).
See also San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 31, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
11. San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 13, 1975, at 10, col. 1.
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premiums. Between 1960 and 1970, premiums for physicians
who do not perform surgery rose 540.8 percent, while for sur-
geons the increase was an astounding 949.2 percent. 12 In the last
two years alone, malpractice rates in California have risen 400
percent. 13
An insurance broker recently stated that in the San Francisco
Bay Area maximum coverage against malpractice claims will cost
an internist who performs no surgery up to $4,000 per year, while
surgeons and anesthesiologists may pay nearly $10,000 per year
for their malpractice coverage.' 4 In Michigan and Texas, some
surgeons pay annual premiums in excess of $20,000 for similar
coverage.' 5
Perhaps the most startling statistic involving malpractice in-
surance rates is the proposed 1975 premium of $43,000 to be re-
quired of New York neurosurgeons and orthopedists.'0 This in-
credible sum contrasts with the 1965 premium of $819 and the
1974 premium of $14,000 paid by the same physicians.'7
Peer Review Committees
Another measure taken by the malpractice insurers to deal
with the malpractice crisis has been to encourage local medical
societies which have group malpractice insurance policies to estab-
lish peer review committees.18 The purpose of the peer review
committees is to determine which physicians in the local area have
demonstrated a high level of professional competence and are,
therefore, good risks for a malpractice insurer.' In making de-
terminations as to whether a physician is a good insurance risk,
the committee usually looks to three factors: (1) the quality of
the physician's work, (2) the number of malpractice claims pre-
viously brought against the physician, and (3) the number and
amount of any settlements obtained and/or judgments rendered
against the physician. °
Physicians who are classified by the committee as bad risks
frequently will not be able to obtain malpractice insurance under
12. HEW, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 13 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION ON
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE].
13. San Francisco Chronicle, July 3, 1974, at 7, col. 2.
14. Id.
15. Malpractice: The High Cost, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1974, at 50.
16. Repoit on Medical Malpractice, CBS Evening News, Jan. 23, 1975.
17. Id.
18. Telephone interview with Dr. Frank J. Boutin, member of Sacramento
County Medical Review Committee, Sept. 7, 1974.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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the local medical society's group insurance policy. 2 If insurance
coverage is extended, the insurance premiums will be increased
significantly, or the insured will be required to assume a large de-
ductible amount.22
Screening Panels
Reacting to the significant increase in the number of mal-
practice claims, insurance companies and physicians also have es-
tablished screening panels to review these claims.23 At the pres-
ent time there are four major types of screening panels: the
medical-legal screening panel, the court-sponsored screening
panel, the statutory screening panel, and the physician screening
panel. All of the panels share in varying degrees the common
goal of encouraging the settlement of meritorious claims and the
abandonment of claims which, in the particular panel's judgment,
are not supported by sufficient evidence of professional negli-
gence to merit a lawsuit for malpractice. 24 It is important to note
that none of the panels determines the merits of the claims with
finality as would arbitration of a malpractice action.25
Medical-legal screening panel. One type of screening com-
mittee utilized in some areas is the medical-legal screening panel.
Such a panel has been established in Pima County, (Tucson),
Arizona. The Pima County panel is composed of both doctors
and lawyers who serve on a voluntary basis.26 There are two fif-
teen-member committees in Pima County which actively review
malpractice claims.27 One of the committees is appointed by the
County Medical Association and the other by the local Bar Asso-
ciation.2" When a request for a hearing is presented to the chair-
man of either committee by either the plaintiff or the defendant-
doctor-and if both sides then agree to a hearing-the chairmen
of the two committees select seven doctors and seven attorneys
to hear the case.2 In addition, the chairmen appoint a physician
to assist the claimant in preparing his or her case for the panel.3"
No charge is imposed on the claimant for the assistance he or she
receives from the physician."
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Are Malpractice Screening Panels the Answer? MEDICAL ECONOMICS 106
(Mar. 1, 1971) [hereinafter cited as Malpractice Screening Panels].
24. COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 12, at App. 224.
25. Id.
26. Malpractice Screening Panels, supra note 23, at 119.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 120.
31. Id.
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When the panel has heard the case and made its decision,
both sides are expected to abide by it; neither side, however, is
legally bound by the committee's decision. 2 In the vast majority
of cases the parties accept the decision of the screening panel.
Statistics indicate that even when a plaintiff is confronted by an
unfavorable decision, he rarely pursues his case in court; and,
when the panel finds in favor of the plaintiff, the physician and
insurer invariably settle.3"
Proponents of the medical-legal screening panel contend that
it offers numerous advantages. They argue that the panel keeps
the physician's name out of the newspapers and keeps the physi-
cian out of the courtroom. 34 Proponents also urge that review by
the panel is objective and aids in the disposition of malpractice
claims.3 5 In addition, it is argued that since the medical-legal re-
view committee provides expert witnesses to plaintiffs, it ends
the so-called conspiracy of silence whereby physicians refuse to
testify against their colleagues who are defendants in malpractice
cases.3 6 Finally, these proponents claim that the medical-legal
review committee has been successful in decreasing the number
of malpractice suits filed.37
It should be noted that the medical-legal review committees
also have been the subject of considerable criticism. Critics of
the medical-legal panels contend that they are too "plaintiff-
oriented," and that too many cases are decided against the physi-
cian.3 1 In addition, it is argued that if the panel decides that a
malpractice complaint has merit, the plaintiff invariably demands
a settlement twice as large as the damages warrant.3 9  Further,
so the critics contend, since such panels have not been models
of cooperation between the medical and legal professions, the ef-
fectiveness of the medical-legal panel has suffered.40 Finally, cri-
tics of the medical-legal review committee argue that the panels
are ineffective inasmuch as they have not stabilized the cost of
malpractice insurance.41
Court-sponsored screening panel. Two jurisdictions, New
Jersey and New York, have established screening panels which,
32. Id. at 119.
33. Id. at 120.
34. Id. at 127.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 128.
37. Id. at 135.
38. Id. at 127.
39. Id.
40. Comment, Medical-Legal Screening Panels As An Atlernative Approach
to Medical Malpractice Claims, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 695, 717 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Medical-Legal Screening Panels].
41. Id.
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unlike the medical-legal review committees, are administered un-
der state court systems.42 The New York panel operates as a pre-
trial mediation board with a judge, physician, and lawyer encour-
aging the parties to settle.43  In New Jersey, both the claimant
and the physician exercise some control over the operation of the
panel. Prior to the review of his claim, the claimant enters into
an agreement with the screening panel under which he promises
not to pursue his case in court, if the panel finds no evidence of
malpractice.44 In return, the medical society will provide an ex-
pert witness for the plaintiff, should the panel find for the claim-
ant.45 The defendant-physician similarly exercises control over
the operation of the review panel, in that no review hearing may
be held without his consent. 6
Statutory screening panel. Only New Hampshire has estab-
lished a statutory screening panel. 7 Under the New Hampshire
plan, claims against physicians (and dentists and lawyers) are
heard by a three-member panel composed of one judicial officer,
one member of the public, and one physician.48 Unlike other
screening panels, the New Hampshire panel not only determines
the issue of liability but also ascertains with particularlity money
damages.4" However, the finding as to the appropriate amount
of money damages is only advisory; the parties are free either to
accept the finding of the panel, or to reject it and bring suit.50
Physician screening panel. The fourth type of malpractice
screening committee is that which is composed entirely of physi-
cians. More malpractice claims are brought before this type of
screening panel than any other review committee. In California,
physician screening panels now exist in more than twenty coun-
ties.51 It is estimated that 11.1 percent of malpractice claims
nationwide are currently brought before physician panels.52 In
contrast, the highly-publicized medical-legal screening panels re-
view only 1.9 per cent of all malpractice claims. 5
The purposes of the physician screening panel serves two
functions. First, the panel determines whether the defendant-
42. COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 12, at App. 225.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 225-26.
49. Id. at 227.
50. id.
51. Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 849 n.3,
107 Cal. Rptr. 604, 608 n.2 (1973).
52. COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 12, at App. 225 n.5.
53. Id. at n.7.
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physician, in treating the plaintiff-patient, met the standard of care
in the community.54  By making such a determination, the panel
is able to advise the insurer as to whether a particular malpractice
claim is well-founded and should be settled, or whether it is with-
out foundation and should be litigated. The second function of the
medical review panel is to discourage the filing and prosecution of
unmeritorious malpractice claims.55
An example of the physician review committee is the screen-
ing panel utilized in Sacramento, California. The Sacramento
committee is composed of fifteen physicians who review malprac-
tice claims brought against other physicians who are insured
through the Sacramento County Medical Society's group malprac-
tice insurance policy.56 Like physician screening panels else-
where, the purposes of the Sacramento Review Committee are to
deter the filing of baseless suits and to aid the insurance company
in determining which malpractice claims are meritorious.5 7 Sac-
ramento's Medical Review Committee uses the following pro-
cedure to accomplish these purposes.
First, a member of the committee, known as the case man-
ager, reviews all of the pleadings and files in the particular case.58
A different member of the committee acts as case manager for
each case and, if the defendant-doctor is a specialist, the case
manager is usually a practitioner of the same specialty.59 Second,
the case manager makes a presentation to the committee, which
includes a summation of the facts of the case as well as an evalua-
tion of the merits. After the case manager's presentation, the re-
view committee discusses the case and votes on whether the de-
fendant-physician has deviated from the standard of care of the
community.60
Proponents of the all-physician review committee (medical
review committee) contend that the continued effectiveness of
such panels is now in doubt because of the recent California case,
Garner v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co."' In Garner,
the Court of Appeal for the Third District held that an insurance
carrier cannot delegate its independent judgment regarding the
54. Brief for Respondent at 39, Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31
Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
55. Id.
56. Telephone interview with Dr. Frank J. Boutin, member of Sacramento
County Medical Review Committee, Sept. 7, 1974.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
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acceptability of a settlement offer to a medical review commit-
tee. 6
THE GARNER DECISION
The Facts
American Mutual Liability Insurance Company issued a
group medical malpractice insurance policy to the Sacramento
County Medical Society, under which individual doctors could buy
malpractice coverage for the amount they desired and the prem-
ium they were willing to pay. In accordance with the terms of
that policy, plaintiff-physician (defendant in the underlying mal-
practice action) was insured for a maximum of $100,000.
While the policy was in effect, Dr. Garner treated a woman
patient who died under his care. Her heirs sued Dr. Garner for
malpractice. Since Dr. Garner's insurance carrier (American
Mutual) refused on the advice of Sacramento's Medical Review
Committee to settle the case, the malpractice claim went to trial.
The jury rendered a $225,000 judgment against the physician
($125,000 over his policy limits), and he proceeded to file an ex-
cess judgment action against American Mutual. In this action the
trial court rejected Dr. Garner's allegation that American Mutual
had acted in bad faith in refusing to settle within the policy limits,
and rendered judgment for the insurance company. On appeal,
the appellate court reversed the trial court and directed that judg-
ment be entered in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of the in-
surer's liability.63
The Holding and Reasoning
The court of appeal held that American Mutual had com-
mitted a breach of duty for failing to accept or initiate reasonable
settlement offers within the policy limits. 4 In reaching its con-
clusion, the court first noted that in California there is an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every liability insurance
policy, which includes the duty to accept settlement offers under
certain conditions.65 Moreover, this duty requires that the insurer
62. Id. at 849, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
63. Id. at 851, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
64. Id. at 849, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
65. Id. at 847, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 606-07. The Garner court cited a number
of cases which establish this proposition: Shapero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 14 Cal.
App. 3d 433, 438, 92 Cal. Rptr. 244, 247 (1971), in which the court affirmed
a judgment for the defendant-insurance company in an action by an insured
against his insurer for damages arising from the insurer's failure to settle a claim
within the policy limits; Hodges v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d
564, 574, 18 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1961) in which the court held that the evidence
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itself consider and determine whether or not a settlement offer
is in the best interest of the insured.66 Because American Mutual
delegated exclusive authority to the Medical Review Committee to
determine whether or not to settle the case, it was held to have
breached its duty vis-a-vis Dr. Garner.6 7  Thus, the Garner court
found that American Mutual's reliance upon the recommendation
of the Medical Review Committee resulted in an inadequate con-
sideration of the non-medical aspects of the case (such as the
appearance and effect upon the jury of the parties and witnesses)
and a deprivation of the protection, to which Dr. Garner was en-
titled, from American Mutual's total experience and expertise in
claims evaluation.6 8
The validity of these conclusions is questionable. The
former determination is suspect because it is clear that the review
committee had made a good faith and intelligent consideration of
the case, as is required by California case law.69 The latter con-
clusion is equally unpersuasive because the review committee pro-
cedure assures that the past experiences of the insurer in evalu-
ating malpractice claims will be drawn upon in determining
whether or not to settle.70
CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE
Duty of Insurer to Settle
It is well established in California that although an insurance
policy contains an express statement only of the insurer's duty to
defend, the insurer has an implied obligation to accept a reason-
able settlement designed to absolve its insured of further liability
to a third party., I This duty to accept a reasonable offer of settle-
ment is implied in the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
would not sustain findings of bad faith on the part of the insurer in not accepting
a settlement offer; and Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 689, 319
P.2d 69, 75 (1957) in which the court reversed a judgment for defendant-insur-
ance company where the insurer unreasonably refused to accept a settlement offer
in an action against the insured.
66. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 848, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
67. Id. at 850, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 608-09.
68. Id. at 849, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
69. See text accompanying notes 81-84, infra.
70. See text accompanying note 90, infra.
71. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 460, 521 P.2d 1103,
1108, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716 (1974), noted in 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 232
(1974); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429-33, 426 P.2d 173, 176-
78, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16-18 (1967); Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50
Cal. 2d 654, 658-61, 328 P.2d 198, 202 (1958). See also Hills & Pivnicka, De-
velopment and Direction of the California Bad Faith Insurance Doctrine or "0
Ye of Little Faith," 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 29 (1973); Comment, California-In Search
of a Solution for Excess Liability Problems, 8 SANTA CLARA LAW. 97 (1967).
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which exists in every insurance contract.7 2  Violation of this duty
of the insurer sounds in ,tort, and an insured may recover for all
detriment resulting from such violation r.7  In the Garner case the
key issue was whether the insurance company acted in good faith
in refusing to settle the case brought against Dr. Garner.
The traditional test of whether an insurance carrier acted in
good faith in refusing to settle a case is set forth in Crisci v. Se-
curity Insurance Co. 74  In that case the California Supreme Court
held that the test of good faith is "whether a prudent insurer
without policy limits would 'have accepted the settlement offer.
75
In Garner, the trial court found that a prudent insurer would not
have accepted the plaintiff's settlement offer regardless of the
limits of Dr. Garner's policy. 76 Although the determination of
this issue is solely within the province of the trier of fact7 7 (in
this case, the trial court), the court of appeal refused to recognize
the lower court finding.
In addition to the test set forth in Crisci, California cases
have utilized several other tests to determine whether an insurer
has breached his duty to act in good faith. For example, in Brown
v. Guarantee Insurance Co., 8 the court recited the following fac-
tors to be considered in deciding the issue of good faith:
[T]he strength of the injured claimant's case on the -issues of
liability and damages; attempts by the insurer to induce the
insured to contribute to a settlement; failure of the insurer to
properly investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the
evidence against the insured; the insurer's rejection of advice
of its own attorney or agent; failure of the insurer to inform
the insured of a compromise offer; the amount of financial
risk to which each party is exposed in the event of a refusal to
settle; the fault of the insured in inducing the insurer's rejec-
tion of the compromise offer by misleading it as to the facts;
and any other factors tending to establish or negate bad faith
on the part of the insurer.79
72. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 460, 521 P.2d 1103,
1108, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 716 (1974); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,
429-33, 426 P.2d 173, 176-78, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16-18 (1967); Communale v.
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658-61, 328 P.2d 198, 202 (1958).
73. Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 460, 521 P.2d 1103,
1109, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711, 717 (1974).
74. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
75. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
76. Brief for Respondent at 35, Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31
Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
77. Hodges v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 198 Cal. App. 2d 564, 574, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 23 (1961).
78. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
79. Id. at 689. 319 P.2d at 75.
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Although this is a comprehensive set of rules, it clearly is not a
workable test for good faith.
A more functional test of whether an insurance company
exercised good faith in refusing to settle a case is found in Palmer
v. Financial Indemnity Co."° In Palmer, the court noted that
the exercise of good faith requires that the consideration
given to the offer of settlement should be an intelligent one,
should be based on a reasonable investigation, and should be
made by persons reasonably qualified to make a decision re-
specting the risks involved."'
If -the Garner court had applied this test, its decision might have
been different.
First, the evidence in the case indicates that the Medical Re-
view Committee made a good faith and intelligent consideration
of the offer to settle the malpractice case brought against Dr. Gar-
ner. The Committee carefully considered the merits of the case
against the physician on two separate occasions and each time it
unanimously found that Dr. Garner had committed no malprac-
tice."2
Second, the investigation made by the insurance carrier and
the Medical Review Committee was adequate. Two lawyers were
assigned to represent Dr. Garner and they utilized numerous dis-
covery tools in preparation for trial.8" In addition, since the trial
court found that American Mutual had not acted in bad faith in
refusing to settle the case, 4 it can be inferred that the company
had in all probability conducted a reasonably complete investiga-
tion of the case against Dr. Garner.
Finally, it seems clear that a group of distinguished physi-
cians sitting on a review committee is "reasonably qualified" to
determine whether a particular malpractice claim is meritorious.
The Garner court, however, did not think that such a group was
sufficiently qualified to make the final decision on whether to
settle. The court decided that the Committee's decision-making
process did not allow for due consideration of the strengths and
weaknesses of the case as it would be presented at trial.8" In
addition, the court noted that by giving the Medical Review Com-
mittee sole power to determine whether to settle, the insured was
80. 215 Cal. App. 2d 419, 30 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1963).
81. id. at 428-29, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 208.
82. Brief for Respondent at 11, Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31
Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
83. Id. at 11-12.
84. Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 851, 107
Cal. Rptr. 604, 609 (1973).
85. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 850, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 608.
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precluded from receiving the benefit of American Mutual's ex-
perience and expertise in claims evaluation. 6
These criticisms are not persuasive in light of the fact that
the Medical Review Committee was organized to handle these
specific types of problems. The insurance carrier's trial counsel
may refer a case back to the Medical Review Committee for fur-
ther evaluation if, during the trial, new evidence appears or a con-
cern develops over the strength of the defendant-physician's
case.8 7 If the Medical Review Committee finds evidence of mal-
practice upon re-evaluation, it may recommend a settlement.8 In
the Garner case, nothing occurred during the trial to mitigate Dr.
Garner's counsel's conviction that his client had not committed
malpractice; thus the case was not returned to the committee for
a further evaluation. 89 Viewed in this light, the Garner court's
criticism that the committee never considers the merits of a case
as it is presented at trial is unfounded.
To guarantee that the insured receives the benefit of the in-
surer's experience in claims evaluation, insurance company offi-
cials, including the insurer's attorneys, its manager of local opera-
tions, investigators and claims adjusters, attend all Medical Review
Commitee hearings.00 Thus, representatives of the insurance car-
rier are able to consider all medical and legal aspects of a particu-
lar malpractice claim, thereby assuring that the insurer's expertise
will be utilized in deciding whether or not to settle.
In reaching its decision that American Mutual had breached
its duty of good faith to Dr. Garner, the Garner court ignored two
important California cases, Hodges v. Standard Accident Insur-
ance Co.91 and Marsango v. Automobile Club of Southern Cali-
fornia.92
In Hodges, the plaintiff brought an action against his insur-
ance company to recover the amount of a personal injury judg-
ment rendered against him in excess of the limits of his auto-
mobile liability policy ($10,000). The plaintiff alleged that the
insurance company had acted in bad faith by refusing to settle the
personal injury action for the sum of $5,000 prior to the time of
the judgment, which was $35,721.20 (later reduced by the court
86. Id.
87. Brief for Respondent at 40, Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31
Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Telephone interview with Dr. Frank J. Boutin, member of Sacramento
County Medical Review Committee, Sept. 14, 1974.
91. 198 Cal. App. 2d 564, 18 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1961).
92. 1 Cal. App. 3d 688, 82 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1969).
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to $27,721.20). At trial, the court gave judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and against the insurance company in the amount of the
excess personal injury judgment. 3 The court of appeal reversed
the trial court's finding that the insurance company had acted in
bad faith in refusing to settle. The court found the trial court's
ruling erroneous because (1) the insurer's attorney felt that even
if the plaintiff (defendant in the underlying personal injury ac-
tion) were found liable, the case was worth much less than the
plaintiff's policy limits, and (2) the insurer's attorney believed
that it was a "50-50 case for liability. 9 4
In Marsango, the plaintiff had originally obtained a personal
injury judgment in excess of the defendant's insurance policy
limits. The plaintiff, as an assignee of the original defendant (in-
sured) in the personal injury action, thereupon filed suit against
the defendant insurer. The plaintiff alleged that the insurer had
acted in bad faith because, prior to the time of the $90,000 judg-
ment rendered in the personal injury action, it had refused to
settle the case for a sum within the insured's policy limits. The
trial court held that the insurer had not acted in bad faith and
the appellate court affirmed.9  The court of appeal found that
the insurer's experienced trial counsel had determined, on the
basis of the facts developed in the preparation of the case, that
the insured would incur no exposure beyond the policy limits. 6
Therefore, the court held that there did not exist such a great risk
of recovery beyond the policy limits as to have required the in-
surer to settle out of consideration for the interest of the insured."
A close examination of the facts in Garner reveals that the
factors relied upon by the courts in Hodges and Marsango were
also present in the Garner case. First, the counsel assigned by
American Mutual to defend Dr. Garner determined, on the basis
of a careful and conscientious evaluation of the case against the
physician, that no verdict would be returned against him.9 8 In
addition, the attorneys believed that even if the jury were to find
Dr. Garner liable, the judgment rendered against him would not
exceed his policy limits.9
In addition to the factors present in Hodges and Marsango,
there existed in Garner two other elements which made it reason-
93. 198 Cal. App. 2d at 567, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
•94. Id. at 574-75, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
95. Marsango v. Automobile Club of So. Cal., 1 Cal. App. 3d 688, 690-93,
82 Cal. Rptr. 92, 93-95 (1969).
96. Id. at 696, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
97. Id. at 697, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
98. Brief for Respondent at 12, Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31
Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
99. Id.
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able for American Mutual to anticipate that a verdict against Dr.
Garner, if rendered, would not exceed the physician's policy
limits. First, since the Medical Review Committee had found that
Dr. Garner had committed no malpractice in treating the deceased
patient, 100 the insurer could reasonably conclude that no verdict
would be rendered against its insured. Second, Dr. Garner's coun-
sel believed that if any verdict were rendered against the doctor,
the other defendant, a local hospital, would also have been held
liable. Thus the counsel thought that any judgment awarded to
the plaintiff would be reduced by half, insofar as Garner himself
was concerned. 1 1
In essence, the Garner court adopted a new, hindsight ap-
proach for determining whether an insured breached its duty to
act in good faith in refusing to settle an action against its insured.
It is clear, of course, that American Mutual's decision not to settle
was unfortunate for Dr. Garner and the company. However, the
mere fact that the insurer's decision was unfortunate and incorrect
(in the sense that a verdict was returned in excess of the insured's
policy limits) does not necessarily support the conclusion that the
company breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Moreover, it is well-established by California case law that the
question whether a course of conduct was proper cannot be de-
cided on the basis of hindsight10a Unfortunately, the Garner
court seems to have ignored this important principle of California
law.
Contracts of Adhesion and Contracts Against Public Policy
The Garner holding also appears to run counter to basic prin-
ciples of contract law. The decision ignores the fact that in agree-
ing to be insured by American Mutual, Dr. Garner approved the
policy's provision that no claims would be settled by the insurance
carrier without a hearing by the Medical Review Committee to
determine whether the physician had committed malpractice.
Such a provision should be binding on both parties, unless the in-
sured can show that the term was in some way contrary to public
policy or that it transformed the policy into a contract of adhesion.
Relevant California case law probably would not support a
100. Garner .. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 846, 107
Cal. Rptr. 604, 606 (1973).
101. Brief for Respondent at 13, Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31
Cal. App. 3. ,43, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
102. Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 11, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,
515 (1972); Scarano v. Schnoor, 158 Cal. App. 2d 612, 622, 323 P.2d 178, 184
(1958).
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finding that American Mutual's insurance policy was unconscion-
able for either reason. It is well established that a contract of
adhesion is a contract drafted by the party of superior bargaining
power, prepared without serious negotiations between the parties,
and used in all dealings relating to the product or service the
stronger party offers.103  Although American Mutual might have
been in a superior bargaining position vis-a-vis the Medical Soci-
ety which negotiated Dr. Garner's malpractice insurance policy,
the other two elements essential to an adhesion contract were not
present in Garner's contract. First Dr. Garner's insurance policy
was negotiated by the Sacramento County Medical Society on be-
half of Garner and the other society members."°  In such nego-
tiations, the terms and conditions of the policy were the subject
of intense negotiations between American Mutual and the Medi-
cal Society.' 5 The medical review provision was forced upon
neither the Medical Society nor its member physicians, including
Dr. Garner. To the contrary, the inclusion of the crucial medical
review provision was insisted upon by the vast majority of the
Medical Society's members. 0 6 In addition, the trier of fact deter-
mined that Dr. Garner had fully concurred in and approved the
policy under which American Mutual reserved the right to refuse
to settle a case in which the Medical Review Committee con-
cluded that there had been no malpractice. 7
As noted above, another characteristic of most adhesion con-
tracts is that the contract form, or one of its provisions, is used
in all dealings relating to the product or service the stronger party
offers. This element was not present in Dr. Garner's contract of
insurance with American Mutual. The medical review provision
in Garner's policy is not included in all of American Mutual's mal-
practice insurance policies, and it was included only at the request
of the Sacramento County Medical Society.' 08
The Garner court also seemed to overlook the fact that the
103. Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract: A Com-
parative Study in the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36 TuL. L.R. 481
(1962); See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d.263, 269, 419 P.2d 168,171z
73, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107-09 (1966); Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal.
2d 92, 98-101, 383 P.2d 441, 444-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36-38 (1963).
104. Brief for Respondent at 38-39, Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
105. Id.
106. Telephone interview with Dr. Frank J. Boutin, member of Sacramento
County Medical Review Committee, Sept. 14, 1974.
107. Brief for Respondent at 47, Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31
Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
108. Respondent's Petition for a Hearing by the Supreme Court at 11, Garner
v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
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Sacramento County Medical Society was the "named insured" in
the policy issued by American Mutual.' 09 In accordance with the
terms of that policy, any doctor who was a member of the Society
could become an insured under the policy. However, unlike most
adhesion contract situations, no doctor, including Dr. Garner, was
required to carry insurance through American Mutual. 110 In fact,
20 to 22 percent of the physicians in the Sacramento area are
not insured under the Medical Society's malpractice insurance
policy.11' It is therefore probable that Dr. Garner could have ac-
quired insurance from one of the other three malpractice insurers
in the Sacramento area," 2 and thereby could have avoided Ameri-
can Mutual's requirement that all malpractice claims be evaluated
by a medical review committee.
It is also clear that the medical review committee provision
in Dr. Garner's insurance contract was not contrary to public
policy. In Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co."3 it was held that
certain portions of an airline insurance policy were void as against
public policy. The California Supreme Court noted in that case
that the question of whether a particular contractual provision is
against public policy should be examined in light of the purpose
and intent of the parties in entering into the contract, the insured's
knowledge and understanding of the policy as a reasonable lay-
man, and the insured's normal expectation of the extent of the
policy's coverage." 4 Applying this test to the American Mutual
policy insuring Dr. Garner, it is reasonable to conclude that the
medical review provision was not against public policy. Dr. Gar-
ner entered into the contract with American Mutual with the un-
derstanding and expectation that malpractice suits would be
settled by the insurer only after the Medical Review Committee
had reviewed the case and determined that it had merit.1" No
public policy militates against the formation of a contract by par-
ties who are free to bargain for and are able to understand its
terms. It is significant that the Garner decision constituted a
break from established precedent upholding the right of individ-
uals freely to negotiate and carry out such a contract.
109. Brief for Respondent at 6, Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31
Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
110. Telephone interview with Mr. William Dochterman, Executive Director,
Sacramento Medical Society, Sept. 4, 1974.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962).
114. Id. at 869, 377 P.2d at 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 176.
115. Respondent's Petition for a Hearing by the Supreme Court, App. B at 4-5,
Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr.
604 (1973).
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EFFECTS OF THE GARNER DECISION
Deterring the Filing of Baseless Claims and Encouraging the
Settlement of Meritorious Claims
Through the establishment of medical review committees,
physicians and malpractice insurers have made a viable attempt
to handle malpractice cases more efficiently and equitably. Al-
though the medical review committee is not a panacea, it appears
to be a successful means of "weeding out" malpractice claims
which lack merit and of encouraging settlement of claims that are
meritorious. In most cases, when the review committee finds evi-
dence of malpractice, the insurance company readily enters into
a settlement with the plaintiff. 1 ' In contrast, when the commit-
tee determines that a physician has not committed malpractice,
this finding usually indicates to the plaintiff that his case is legally
weak."17 Since in the past there has been a high correlation be-
tween the medical review committee's decisions and jury verdicts,
a decision by the committee that a physician has committed no
malpractice often convinces the plaintiff not to prosecute his case
further.
A recent statistical analysis of the cases brought against
physicians insured by American Mutual and reviewed by medical
review committees indicates the strength of this assertion. For
example, 46 percent of the cases brought before the medical re-
view committees were never pressed to trial and the insurer made
no payments in settlement of the claims, because the committees
found that there had been no malpractice." l8 In contrast, 33 per-
cent of the cases reviewed by the committees were settled, be-
cause the panels concluded that there had been some malpractice
on the part of the defendant-physician."' Thus, on the basis of
the committees' findings, nearly 80 percent of the cases which
were reviewed by the committees did not go to trial. In the re-
maining 20 percent of the cases, although the panel found no evi-
dence of malpractice, the plaintiff chose to go to trial.120 Of the
cases actually tried, 85 percent resulted in verdicts for the insured,
while only 15 percent were resolved in favor of the plaintiff. 121
The conclusion is inescapable: the medical review com-
mittee has proved to be an effective tool in the evaluation of medi-
116. Brief for Respondent at 8, Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31
Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
117. See text accompanying notes 118-121, infra.
118. Respondent's Petition for a Hearing by the Supreme Court at 9, Garner
v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31 Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at n.9.
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cal malpractice claims. Unfortunately, the Garner decision may
diminish the effectiveness of the medical review committee and
thereby impair the ability of the committee to deter the filing of
baseless claims and to encourage the settlement of those that are
meritorious.
Alternative to Trial
Insurers and physicians have attempted to provide, through
the creation of medical review committees, an alternative to
lengthy and expensive malpractice trials. It appears that the
Garner decision may impair their efforts to provide such an alter-
native.
Prior to Garner, when the Sacramento County Medical Re-
view Committee evaluated a malpractice claim and found it to be
meritorious, the case usually was promptly settled and the plaintiff
avoided long delays in obtaining compensation for his claim.' 22
The committee's determination that a physician had deviated from
the standard of care in the community caused the insurer readily
to settle the case. a23 Thus, the Medical Review Committee pro-
vided the plaintiff whose claim was legitimate a viable alternative
to a long, arduous trial. However, as a result of the Garner de-
cision, the findings of the review committee no doubt will carry
less weight with the malpractice insurer. A committee's finding
that there has been malpractice will no longer guarantee that the
insurance company will make strenuous efforts to settle the case.
Thus, it is ironic that although the Garner decision purports to
encourage settlement of malpractice cases, the actual result may
be that fewer cases will be settled.
Nuisance Suits
According to the chairman of the Medical Review Commit-
tee of the Sacramento Medical Society, another possible effect of
the Garner decision is an increased pressure on insurers to settle
nuisance malpractice cases.' 24 The chairman contends that
Garner creates a new, amorphous test for deciding whether an
insurance company has acted in good faith in refusing to settle
122. Telephone interview with Mr. William Dochterman, Executive Director,
Sacramento County Medical Society, Sept. 4, 1974.
123. Brief for Respondent at 8, Garner v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 31
Cal. App. 3d 843, 107 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1973).
124. Sheridan, Malpractice: Can they force you to stand trial?, MEDICAL ECON.
73, 78 (June 24, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Stand Trial]. A nuisance suit is one
in which the plaintiff's claim is highly suspect, but in which the cost of defense
is substantially in excess of the claim.
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a malpractice claim against an insured physician.'25 In addition,
another proponent of the medical review committee argues that
the case propounds the theory that, in deciding whether to enter
into a settlement with a plaintiff, the emotional factors of a case
(the plaintiff's appearance and appeal to the jury) are more im-
portant than an honestly arrived-at, good faith decision that there
was no malpractice.' 26
Traditionally, the insured physician has been reluctant to
settle a case of dubious merit for fear of ruining his reputation
as a competent doctor. 127  In contrast, the malpractice insurer,
prior to the advent of the medical review committee, was more
inclined to settle doubtful claims because of its desire to minimize
the cost of disposing of the case. 28 With the advent of group
insurance and the creation of the medical review committee, how-
ever, the malpractice insurers became less inclined to settle du-
bious claims, which resulted in the filing of fewer nuisance suits. 129
By employing the review committee, local physicians were able
to advise the insurer as ,to whether or not a physician sued for
malpractice had breached the standard of care of the commu-
nity.130 By accepting such advice, the insurer was confident in the
correctness of its decision to settle or not to settle a case. How-
ever, if the result of the Garner decision is that the judgment of
the medical review committee is to be disregarded, review com-
mittee proponents contend that malpractice suits will be brought
"in the hope that a doctor's fears of -the trauma of going to court
will lead to an unwarranted settlement."' 3 '
Increased Premiums
As noted above,' 2 the Garner decision is likely to lead to
a less effective--or non-existent-medical review committee, and
thus to an increase in the filing and prosecution of unfounded mal-
practice claims. As a result of this increase, physicians' malprac-
tice insurance premiums undoubtedly will continue to rise at a
rapid pace. 3 Unfortunately, these premium increases will most
certainly be passed on to the patient. Indeed, at the present time,
as much as five per cent of a patient's total fee goes to pay the
125. Id. at 79.
126. Statement of William E. Scheuber, Executive Secretary of the Alameda-
Contra Costa Medical Association. Id.
127. Id. at 78.
128. Id.
129. id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 78-79.
132. See text accompanying notes 122-24 supra.
133. COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 12, at 12.
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physician's malpractice insurance premiums.'
In addition, the cost of malpractice insurance may be driven
up because the Garner case tends to undercut the ability of insur-
ance companies to provide malpractice coverage at lower pre-
mium rates. 135  Prior to Garner, some malpractice insurers (in-
cluding American Mutual) required a physician seeking profes-
sional liability insurance coverage to be bound by the decisions
of the medical review committee. Proponents of the medical re-
view committee contend that this requirement ultimately resulted
in a reduction of baseless claims, and consequently minimized the
increase in the cost of malpractice insurance. 8 6 Unfortunately,
the Garner decision limits the right of the insurance company to
include such a requirement in its malpractice insurance policies.
It appears that this limitation may have already resulted in an in-
crease in the cost of malpractice premiums.'
7
Although some malpractice insurance carriers have chosen to
increase their premiums, others have abandoned entirely their ef-
forts to provide malpractice coverage. 13  This unfortunate result is
demonstrated by American Mutual's recent decision to withdraw
from the medical liability field.839  Similarly, another major medi-
cal malpractice insurer in California recently announced that it
was canceling its malpractice policies. 40  In addition, the New
York State Medical Society's insurer for the past 25 years recently
notified the Society that it would discontinue underwriting the
134. Id. at 13.
135. Stand Trial, supra note 124, at 79.
136. Id. at 78.
137. For example, since the Garner decision, insurance premiums paid by
physicians insured under the Sacramento County Medical Society's group insur-
ance policy have risen significantly. The most recent premium increase was a
15 percent rise effective in November, 1974. Telephone interview with Mr. Wil-
liam Dochterman, Executive Director of the Sacramento County Medical Society,
Sept. 4, 1974. In addition, physicians in other Northern California counties who
are insured through group insurance plans may experience similar premium in-
creases. A general surgeon in the San Francisco Bay Area recently stated that
he currently pays an annual premium of $4900 for $1 million of malpractice cov-
erage. He noted, however, that his malpractice premiums in 1976 will be ap-
proximately $17,000 to $19,000 per year, if in fact he can obtain malpractice in-
surance. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 31, 1975, at 18, col. 3. In addition, in
January, 1975, Argonaut Insurance Company, the largest malpractice insurer in
Northern California, announced that it would cancel the group malpractice poli-
cies for physicians in eight Northern California counties. Argonaut's decision to
discontinue providing malpractice coverage is particularly unfortunate since it is
highly unlikely that any of the other three companies offering malpractice insur-
ance in California will step in and furnish such coverage. San Francisco Chron-
icle, Feb. 1, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
138. See, e.g., Stand Trial, supra note 124, at 77.
139. Id. at 77.
140. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 31, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
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group's malpractice insurance policy. 141 Although the Society ul-
timately found a new insurer to underwrite its policy, its agree-
ment with that insurer called for a 100 per cent increase on pre-
vailing premiums."' Moreover, in the last five years, physicians
in Hawaii, Utah, Oregon, Nevada, Maryland, Florida and North
Carolina either found themselves without malpractice coverage, or
faced the possibility of being without such coverage. 141
The continued availability of adequate medical malpractice
insurance for physicians is an absolute necessity.' 44 Malpractice
insurance not only indemnifies physicians, thereby protecting their
assets, but also provides the major source of compensation for
most patients who are injured as a result of a physician's negli-
gence.' 45 Thus, the possibility that physicians might not be able
to obtain medical malpractice insurance in the future should not
be dismissed lightly.
CONCLUSION
The Garner decision may well have struck the death knell
for the effective medical review committee. It is unfortunate that
the Garner court did not recognize the flexibility provided by the
medical review committee and its ability to work in conjunction
with the malpractice insurer to determine the merits of a particu-
lar case. However, by transforming itself in either of two ways,
the medical review committee may continue to exist despite the
Garner decision.
First, the review committee could act as an advisory body to
the insurance carrier, rather than as the ultimate authority on the
question of whether to settle. This is the function presently being
served by Sacramento County's Review Committee.' 6 Although
this method of operation may jeopardize the effectiveness of the
medical review committee, it is clearly preferable to abolishing the
committee altogether.
A second alternative is to transform the medical review com-
mittee into a panel composed of physicians and attorneys. It
should be noted, however, that this type of panel has been the
subject of considerable criticism. It probably has not stabilized
the cost of malpractice insurance, 47 nor has it served as a model
141. Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1974, at 20, col. 4.
142. Id.
143. COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 12, at 39; San Fran-
cisco Chronicle, Jan. 31, 1975, at 18, col. 1.
144. Id. at 38.
145. Id.
146. Stand Trial, supra note 124, at 78.
147. Medical-Legal Screening Panels, supra note 40, at 717.
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of cooperation between the medical and legal professions. 148
Moreover, the panel's decision is generally not binding on the par-
ties, and many persons have litigated their cases after an adverse
panel decision. 149  Finally, the insurance companies have been
dissatisfied with the medical-legal committees for the alleged
favor they have shown plaintiffs. 150
In summary, it appears that it may be difficult to find a satis-
factory replacement for the all-physician review committee. In
any event, it is clear that the Garner decision has not provided
any helpful solutions to the medical malpractice crisis.
Peter R. Boutin
148. Id. at 721.
149. Id. at 716.
150. Id.
